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INTRODUCTION  
Prompted by federal welfare assistance1 and full-faith-and-credit 
statutes,2 an American state trial court now generally exercises subject 
matter jurisdiction to make initial child support determinations if the 
forum is the “home state” of the child on the date of the commencement 
of the proceeding. “Home state” for a child means the last state where the 
child lived with a parent—or a person acting as a parent—for at least six 
consecutive months immediately coming before the time the plaintiff filed 
the initial proceeding.3 When this jurisdiction is exercised, forum 
parentage law is typically employed.4 
Federal lawmakers addressed child support matters after recognizing 
that more and more disputes over children between parents residing in 
different states were occurring, state child support laws were “not 
                                                                                                             
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 654(20) (2012) (a state plan for child and spousal support, 
where the state receives federal welfare aid, must have in effect all laws in § 666); 
42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2012) (each state must have in effect the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 102(8) 
(amended 2008), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/interstate 
%20family%20support/UIFSA_2008_Final_Amended%202015_Revised%20Pr
efatory%20Note%20and%20Comments.pdf [hereinafter UIFSA] (“‘Home state’ 
means the state or foreign country in which a child lived with a parent or a person 
acting as parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the 
time of filing of a [petition] or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is 
less than six months old, the state or foreign country in which the child lived from 
birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted 
as part of the six- month or other period.” (alternation in original)).  
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(b) (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 36/102(7) (West 2009); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 7-1002(8) (West, Westlaw through end of 2015 First Regular and 
First Extraordinary Sessions of the 63rd Legislature). Where a child is less than 
six months old and is the subject of a child support case, the home state typically 
is the state of birth. See, e.g., Ocegueda v. Perreira, 232 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 1081 
(Ct. App. 2015). 
 4. UIFSA, supra note 1, § 303 & cmt. (“Historically states have insisted that 
forum law be applied to support cases whenever possible. This continues to be a 
key principle of UIFSA.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(1) (providing that in a 
proceeding to establish a child support order, the forum state’s law generally 
applies). State laws founded on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act (“URESA”), which the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support 
Act (“RURESA”) amended in 1968, preceded the UIFSA. See, e.g., Colorado ex 
rel. R.L.H., 942 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Colo. App. 1997). 
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uniform,” and noncustodial parents often moved away to avoid the 
jurisdiction of the children’s home states over child support matters.5 
Federal legislators sought “to establish national standards under which 
courts of the various states shall determine their jurisdiction to issue a child 
support order.”6 The federal laws mitigated forum shopping, leading to 
multiple—and often conflicting—child support orders.7 
Under this newly enacted law, where the respondent in an initial child 
support proceeding is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the child’s home 
state, a home state residential parent or person acting as a parent may 
nevertheless initiate a child support proceeding in the home state.8 The court 
then forwards this proceeding to a state court in a state that can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the respondent, typically the respondent’s state of 
residence.9 In a forwarded proceeding, the responding tribunal usually 
applies its own state laws.10 
Obviously, parentage is key to the imposition of a child support order. 
In seeking to limit harm to children and their custodians, as well as to 
facilitate governmental recoveries of child welfare payments from parents, 
Congress enacted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) at 
a time when defining legal parentage was typically straightforward. 
Parentage under state law was usually determined by giving birth, by 
marriage to the birth mother, by designation on a birth certificate—usually 
arising from a paternity lawsuit or a voluntary acknowledgment of 
                                                                                                             
 5. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383, 
108 Stat. 4063 (1994). 
 6. Id. § 2(b). Such nationwide child support jurisdiction standards do not, 
however, mean that there are comparable nationwide jurisdiction standards for 
parentage, or even that there are nationwide standards on defining parentage in 
child support settings.  
 7. See, e.g., In re Schneider, 268 P.3d 215, 218 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) 
(“This potential for competing child support orders, with varying terms and 
duration depending on the issuing jurisdiction, resulted in a proliferation of 
litigation. . . . The UIFSA addressed this ‘chaos’ by establishing a ‘one-order’ 
system for child support orders by providing that one state would have continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction over the order.” (citation omitted)). 
 8. UIFSA, supra note 1, § 301(b).  
 9. Id. § 304(a). The child support petitioner typically can agree to the 
responding tribunal’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction on issues of custody, 
parenting time, and the like. See, e.g., In re Paternity of J.G., 19 N.E.3d 278 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
 10. UIFSA, supra note 1, § 303; 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(1) (2012). On occasion, 
a custodial parent will be sued in a nonresidential state on the issue of the resident 
petitioner’s parentage, even though the custodial parent cannot be pursued there on 
child support or child custody matters. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Lechuga, 393 S.W.3d 
113, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  
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paternity—or by a formal adoption undertaken with judicial oversight.11 
In each setting, parentage arose at a distinct moment in time. Since 
Congress acted, however, many states have redefined legal parentage in 
ways, as with de facto parenthood and equitable adoption, that have no 
precise moment of origination.12 New imprecise forms of parentage 
emerged because family structures changed; today, more same-sex 
marriages, as well as more unwed same- and opposite-sex couples, are 
raising children together.13  
Similar to the establishment of parentage, states have created new, 
imprecise forms of disestablishing initial parentage designations since 
Congress enacted the UIFSA. This change includes rebuttals of marital 
paternity presumptions and rescissions of voluntary paternity 
acknowledgements.14 New imprecise forms of parentage disestablishment 
emerged for several reasons, including better and more widely available 
genetic testing and the increasing numbers of births to unwed mothers that 
have prompted more rescindable paternity acknowledgments.  
Because parentage is not defined clearly, courts must look back in time 
to decide whether certain acts, like household residence or a parental-like 
relationship, occurred. Many state courts exercising non-forwarded and 
forwarded home-state jurisdiction in initial child support cases are now 
choosing to apply their own imprecise parentage laws when examining 
acts occurring elsewhere.15 When states differ in these new imprecise 
forms of parentage, as they often do,16 undesirable forum shopping is 
encouraged and uncertainty reigns. These problems are exactly what 
Congress tried to address when it enacted the UIFSA.17 
                                                                                                             
 11. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Dangers in De Facto Parenthood, 37 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 25, 29–30 (2014) (presumed parents) [hereinafter Parness, 
Dangers]; Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John 
Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 53 (2010) (voluntary paternity acknowledgments).  
 12. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution: The Key Questions, 
59 WAYNE L. REV. 743, 752–63 (2013) [hereinafter Parness, Parentage Law 
(R)Evolution].  
 13. See Katherine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of 
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 652 n.9 (2008). 
 14. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Challenges in Handling Imprecise Parentage 
Matters, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 401, 409–10 (forthcoming 2015) 
[hereinafter Parness, Handling Imprecise Parentage]; see also Parness & 
Townsend, supra note 11.  
 15. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 16. See Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 12, at 757–58. 
 17. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text; see also Patricia W. 
Hatamyar, Interstate Establishment, and Modification of Child Support Orders, 
25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 511, 514–19 (2000) (reviewing history and operation 
of the UIFSA); Laura W. Morgan, Note, Pre-Emption or Abdication? Courts Rule 
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The establishment of parentage and the disestablishment of legal 
parentage matters beyond mere child support cases, and thus its ambiguity 
affects other areas of family law. State trial courts must establish legal 
parentage where the parties dispute parental child-caretaking opportunities.18 
For example, in a paternity action, an alleged unwed biological father may 
seek a childcare order against an unwed birth mother. In a parentage action, a 
woman may seek a childcare order in a proceeding against her former lesbian 
partner, an objecting birth mother. Here too, courts often choose to apply their 
own imprecise parentage laws where relevant parental-like conduct occurred 
elsewhere.19  
In cases other than initial child support proceedings, state trial courts 
often must consider the disestablishment of legal parentage. For example, 
either a wife or a husband may seek to disestablish the husband’s 
parentage arising from a marital presumption.20 A birth mother, a male 
signatory, or someone else may seek to disestablish the signing male’s 
parentage arising from a voluntary paternity acknowledgment.21 State 
courts often employ their own parentage laws on rebuttals or rescissions,22 
which do not recognize precise moments of parentage disestablishment.23 
                                                                                                             
Federal Law Trumps State Law in Child Support Jurisdiction, 24 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 217, 217–24 (2011) (providing the history of the UIFSA).  
 18. Home state courts on occasion decline to exercise jurisdiction where 
another state’s court has already acted and where, for example, there are 
“emergency” health issues for the child. See, e.g., J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732, 
746 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc) (deference to earlier-filed Florida adoption proceeding 
where child’s home state was Arizona). 
 19. See infra Part IV.C. 
 20. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) (two presumed fathers 
willing to childcare); State v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224 (Wyo. 2001) (neither presumed 
father willing to childcare).  
 21. See infra Part IV.D.  
 22. Forum laws are not applied, however, in certain circumstances where the 
parties ask the forum court to enforce a child support order issued by a court of a 
different state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(2), (3) (2012). See, e.g., Johns v. Johns, No. 
W2013–01102–COA–R3–CV, 2013 WL 6050939, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 
15, 2013) (holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(3), federal law required a 
Tennessee court to apply the longer Arkansas limitations period when asked to 
enforce an Arkansas child support order in arrears). 
 23. For example, male parentage disestablishments in both marital 
presumption and voluntary acknowledgement settings sometimes depend more 
upon subjective standards, like equitable estoppel and duress, than upon objective 
standards, like lack of genetic ties. Exemplary cases denying rebuttals of marital 
paternity presumptions without genetic ties between children and husbands 
include settings where the husband or wife is estopped from rebutting due to the 
man’s developed parental-relationship with the martial child. See, e.g., Hinshaw 
v. Hinshaw, 237 S.W.3d 170, 173–74 (Ky. 2007) (wife–mother lied to husband 
about his genetic ties, prompting him to establish a strong parent-child 
relationship); see generally Caroline Rogus, Fighting the Establishment: The 
Need for Procedural Reform of Our Paternity Laws, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 67 
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Blood tests alone cannot always undo presumptions or 
acknowledgments.24 Judicial choices to use forum law often occur 
regardless of where significant events, like holding out a child as one’s 
own or providing child support, occurred.25 Applying the state’s own 
forum law sometimes upsets settled expectations and denies adults and 
children their continuing familial relationships. 
Greater attention must be devoted to imprecise state parentage laws 
and the issues they raise in proceedings that initially determine parentage, 
whether they involve child support or childcare,26 as well as in proceedings 
that seek to disestablish legal parentage. The implementation of any of the 
following at the minimum may resolve these issues in part: a newly written 
and uniform set of federal parentage laws, newly written and explicit state 
choice-of-law standards, or state courts more frequently applying imprecise 
foreign state parentage precedents under current choice-of-law standards. 
                                                                                                             
(2014) (suggesting reforms easing burdens on those seeking to rescind voluntary 
paternity acknowledgments). Exemplary cases denying rescissions of voluntary 
paternity acknowledgements without genetic ties between children and male 
acknowledgers include, also, settings where the birth mother or male 
acknowledger is estopped from rebutting due to the man’s developed parental 
relationship with the child. See, e.g., In re Paternity of A.G.P., No. 39A05–1311–
JP–558, 2014 WL 2192799 (Ind. Ct. App. May 27, 2014) (denying the birth 
mother the opportunity to rescind as “[she] cannot take advantage of the fraud she 
herself perpetuated on the court”). Comparably, a presumed parentage 
establishment involving “holding out” a child as one’s own is also generally 
subject to rebuttal on more subjective than objective standards. See, e.g., 
Chaterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 302–08 (N.M. 2012) (considering estoppel and 
inequity when birth mother seeks to rebut the presumption of parenthood). 
 24. See, e.g., R.P. v. K.S.W., 320 P.3d 1084, 1089, 1099 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) 
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607 (2009)) (biological father cannot undo 
marital presumption where the married couple is “committed to remaining 
married”); Helton v. Beamon, 861 N.W.2d 621, 621–22 (Mich. 2015) 
(acknowledgment rescission after 60 days requires not only proof of fraud, duress, 
or mistake, but also a best interests analysis).  
 25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8–103(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2015) 
(“This chapter applies to determinations of parentage in this State. The court shall 
apply the law of this State to adjudicate the parent-child relationship. The 
applicable law does not depend on: (1) The place of birth of the child; or (2) The 
past or present residence of the child.”); ALA. CODE § 26-17-103 (2009); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.103 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700–103 (West 
2009). The provisions cited above were taken from the Uniform Parentage Act. 
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 103 (amended 2002), available at http://www 
.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf [hereinafter UPA]. 
 26. Beyond child support and childcare, courts may need to initially 
determine parentage in proceedings on heirship, DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 
85, 98 (Ill. 2013), on the governmental requirements to provide reunification 
services for parents whose children are in dependency proceedings, In re C.C., 
No. A142870, 2014 WL 6839585, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), and on life 
insurance proceeds, Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 771 F.3d 387, 388 (7th Cir. 
2014).  
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This Article urges the courts to develop new state choice-of-law 
precedents that require the occasional employment of foreign state laws 
for certain imprecise parentage law issues, most often pursuant to a state 
interest analysis.27 
Part I reviews choice of law in initial parentage proceedings. Part II 
introduces the varying forms of imprecise American state parentage laws. 
Part III explores exemplary cases involving judicial respect for earlier 
parentage determinations elsewhere, while Part IV examines exemplary 
cases on choosing imprecise parentage laws when there were no earlier 
determinations. Part V demonstrates how, in choosing between imprecise 
parentage laws, courts should not always choose forum law and should 
instead choose differing state laws in differing settings, as with childcare 
and child support issues.  
I. CHOICE OF LAW IN INITIAL PARENTAGE PROCEEDINGS 
Under federal law, appropriate state authorities, including trial courts, 
must enforce and may not modify certain child support orders made in 
other states.28 Such full faith and credit afforded to foreign state child 
support orders is dependent upon the foreign state court acting pursuant to 
its own state laws, having subject-matter jurisdiction and “personal 
jurisdiction over the contestants;” and giving “reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard . . . to the contestants.”29 A state court, however, 
generally “shall apply” forum law in an initial proceeding to establish a 
child support order under federal law.30 Courts have interpreted this law to 
require the state courts entertaining initial child support petitions to utilize 
their own state laws in determining the parentage of the respondent, when 
the parentage is in doubt.31  
                                                                                                             
 27. This Article does not address American state court responsibilities 
regarding the parentage laws of foreign countries. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3127.04(B)–(C) (West 2011) (provided that if there is no violation of 
“fundamental principles of human rights,” Ohio courts shall recognize and 
enforce child custody determinations made in foreign countries that substantially 
conform with certain jurisdictional standards); In re Yaman, 105 A.3d 600 (N.H. 
2014) (respecting Turkish court order regarding childcare for children then living 
in New Hampshire); In re A.L.C., 16 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (holding 
child born, and remaining in, California is a habitual resident of Sweden per 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”) of Hague Convention).  
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2012). 
 29. See id. § 1738B(c). 
 30. See id. § 1738B(h)(1). In a proceeding involving either the interpretation 
or enforcement of an earlier child support order issued in another state, or both, 
the forum jurisdiction’s laws are not applied. See id. § 1738B(h)(2)–(3).  
 31. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
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The plaintiff in an initial child support proceeding can be “a person 
(including a parent) who . . . claims a right to receive child support” or a 
governmental unit “to which the right to obtain child support has been 
assigned.”32 An issuing court most often is located in the “child’s home 
State,” meaning:  
[T]he State in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting 
as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately preceding 
the time of the filing of a petition or comparable pleading for 
support and, if a child is less than 6 months old, the State in which 
the child lived from birth with any of them.33 
The court in an initial proceeding to establish child support in a home 
state must respect, per federal law, an earlier parentage determination 
made in another state.34 For example, an earlier parentage determination 
may arise in a marriage dissolution or paternity case decree, a formal 
adoption order, or a voluntary parentage declaration.35 An earlier 
determination declares legal parentage at a distinct moment in time for all 
later purposes.36  
As noted earlier, an initial proceeding to establish child support may 
also begin in, but not be finally decided by, a home state court. Where the 
respondent—typically a nonresident—is not subject to personal jurisdiction 
                                                                                                             
 32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(b). 
 33. Id. (“A period of temporary absence of any of [the parents or persons 
acting as parents] is counted as part of the 6-month period.”); see, e.g., Drexler v. 
Bornman, 92 A.3d 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (seven to eight day absence). 
In some cases, there is no home state, as when the child is less than six months 
old and has lived in two or more states. States vary on who can be a nonparent 
qualified as a “person acting as a parent.” Schirado v. Foote, 785 N.W.2d 235, 
241–44 (N.D. 2010). To date, state courts considering the issue have decided the 
unborn cannot have a “home state.” See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 139 So. 3d 802, 806–
08 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).  
 34. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738(a)(1). The home state must also respect certain 
parentage determinations made in other states that were not related to child 
support. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3127.20(A) (West 2011) (providing 
that no Ohio court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction where “a child custody 
proceeding concerning the child is pending in a court of another state having 
jurisdiction”).  
 35. See, e.g., Kielkowski v. Kielkowski, 346 P.3d 690 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) 
(marital presumption of husband’s paternity not rebutted though divorce default 
contained husband’s statement that there were “no children at issue in this 
marriage”); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (stepfather adoption over 
natural father’s objection); 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(A) (2012) (“paternity 
establishment” procedures, including voluntary paternity acknowledgments as 
conditions to state participation in federal welfare subsidy programs).  
 36. See Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
383, 108 Stat. 4063 (1998). 
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in the home state,37 the home state court may forward a child support 
proceeding for decision to a responding tribunal in a state where there is 
personal jurisdiction.38 The second state court must respect an earlier 
parentage determination.39 Courts must also respect earlier parentage 
determinations in other cases, such as cases dealing with childcare petitions 
and marriage dissolution disputes.40  
Where there is no earlier parentage determination, the home state court 
deciding upon child support must first determine parentage,41 as must a non-
home state court deciding a child support case that another court forwarded 
to the non-home state court.42 Further, the court must often undertake an 
initial parentage determination in nonsupport cases, like a paternity action 
where a biological father is seeking court-ordered childcare or a marriage 
dissolution action where a wife disputes the marital presumption of 
parentage to end the husband’s childcare rights for a child born to the wife. 
In each instance, the deciding court will typically apply its own parentage 
law.43  
Federal law seemingly prompts a home state court initially determining 
child support to make any required determination of parentage under its own 
state law.44 Federal law also seemingly prompts a non-home state court, 
responding to a case forwarded by a home state court, to make any required 
determination of parentage under its own state law if the state must initially 
decide child support.45  
Comparably, state courts will sometimes choose to employ their own 
parentage laws in cases not initially seeking child support, but where legal 
parentage is relevant and either not yet determined or earlier determined but 
still subject to challenge. This occurs via a rebuttal of a parentage 
                                                                                                             
 37. The bases for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in an initial child 
support proceeding are found in the UIFSA § 201, which provides requirements 
demanded of states receiving federal welfare aid. UIFSA, supra note 1, § 201. 
 38. Id. § 301(b). 
 39. Id. § 303(1). 
 40. Id. § 305(b) (stating that the second state court can only “determine 
parentage of a child. . . . to the extent not prohibited by other laws”). Other law 
may involve legal requirements that the second state respect an earlier parentage 
determination within or outside the second state. See, e.g., id. § 315 (“A party 
whose parentage of a child has not been previously determined by or pursuant to 
law may not plead nonparentage as a defense . . . .”).  
 41. See, e.g., id. § 201(a) (“In a proceeding to establish . . . a support order or 
to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal 
jurisdiction . . . if . . . the individual resided with the child in this state.”).  
 42. Id. § 305(b)(1). 
 43. Id.  
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(1) (2012). 
 45. UIFSA, supra note 1, § 303(2) (“[D]etermine the duty of support . . . in 
accordance with the law . . . of [the] state.”).  
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presumption or a rescission of a voluntary parentage acknowledgment.46 
Perhaps a state’s adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act, which says a 
court adjudicating “the parent-child relationship” must apply its own law 
regardless of the “place of birth of the child” or the “past or present 
residence of the child,” motivates many courts.47 In some parentage 
settings, state courts fail to consider that their own state laws, particularly 
their own choice of law standards, prompt the courts to apply foreign state 
parentage laws.48  
Crouch v. Smick, a 2014 Illinois Appellate Court ruling, is exemplary 
of an overly hasty, although ultimately correct, employment of forum 
parentage law.49 In that case, a former wife and resident of California 
sought to terminate the parental rights of her former husband, a resident of 
Illinois, in an Illinois state court.50 The couple divorced in Illinois, where 
a court had earlier decided post-marital custody and visitation issues of the 
marital children.51 The mother pursued a termination of parental rights so 
that her new husband could adopt the children.52 The former husband 
objected.53 The Illinois appellate court sustained the trial court’s retention 
of jurisdiction arising initially from the marriage dissolution proceeding, 
but reversed the lower court’s application of California law, even though 
the mother’s new husband was hoping to adopt her children in California 
with the mother’s approval.54 Crouch applied Illinois law when deciding 
whether to terminate parental rights simply because Illinois continued to 
be the home state of the children.55 Illinois was the home state under law, 
if not in reality, as the former husband remained there. Crouch summarily 
concluded at the outset that “once Illinois is determined to be the home 
state under [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act], 
Illinois law applies.”56 The court later categorically declared: “If an Illinois 
                                                                                                             
 46. See infra Part IV.D–E. 
 47. See, e.g., UPA, supra note 25, § 103(b) (“The court shall apply the law 
of this State to adjudicate the parent-child relationship. The applicable law does 
not depend on: (1) the place of birth of the child; or (2) the past or present 
residence of the child.”). Several American states adopted the language of the 
UPA. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-103(b) (West 2013); ALA. CODE § 
26-17-103 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-03(a) (West 2008); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 160.103(b) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8–103(b) (West 
Supp. 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700–103 (West 2009). 
 48. See infra Part V. 
 49. 24 N.E.3d 300 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
 50. Id. at 303. 
 51. Id. at 301. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 301, 302. 
 55. Id. at 305. 
 56. Id. at 301. 
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court is determined to be the home state for jurisdiction, it is necessarily 
the state with the most significant relationship for choice-of-law purposes 
and Illinois law applies.”57 
The Illinois appellate court’s reasoning was based on the unfounded 
assumption that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act (“UCCJEA”), and its predecessor the Uniform Child Custody and 
Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), would be undermined when applying any 
California laws, as “jurisdictional conflicts” and “forum shopping” would 
arise.58 The court failed to distinguish, however, between jurisdiction and 
choice of law, and also failed to recognize—as did the California adoption 
court59—that a choice-of-law interest analysis would also prompt the use 
of Illinois law. The main issues involved the former husband’s alleged 
abandonment, disability due to drug addiction, developmental disability, 
and mental disability, so that most relevant evidence “is in Illinois.”60 In 
other post-dissolution disputes, however, a choice-of-law interest 
analysis—which often guides Illinois courts in other true conflict 
settings61—might favor California law. Consider, for example, what law 
should apply in an Illinois proceeding when a California mother seeks to 
have her new husband declared a presumed or de facto parent, on equal 
footing with her former husband, because of her new husband’s significant 
childcare and parental-like acts in California. In this situation, a true 
conflict would exist as California, in contrast to Illinois, recognizes 
imprecise parentage in the childcare setting via its presumed parent 
statutes.62 These statutes also contemplate the possibility of three parents, 
unlike Illinois.63 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. at 305. 
 58. Id. at 304–05. 
 59. Id. at 303.  
 60. Id. at 302. 
 61. See, e.g., Morris B. Chapman & Assocs. v. Kitzman, 739 N.E.2d 1263, 
1269 (Ill. 2000) (“Ordinarily, Illinois follows the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts of Laws (1971),” including Section 6 encompassing a competing state 
interest analysis.). 
 62. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2013) (presumed parentage for 
person without biological ties or formal adoption), with In re Scarlett Z.D., 28 
N.E.3d 776 (Ill. 2015) (no presumed, de facto, equitable adoption or other 
parentage recognition for childcare purposes without General Assembly action).  
 63. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (three parents including two 
presumed parents and birth mother, where “recognizing only two parents would 
be detrimental to child”), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/204(b) (effective 
Jan. 1, 2016) (with 2 or more conflicting presumptions, a single presumption is 
chosen). 
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II. INTRODUCTION TO IMPRECISE AMERICAN STATE 
PARENTAGE LAWS  
State courts usually respect earlier judicial or judicial-type determinations 
of legal parentage made in foreign states.64 These determinations deem 
parentage to have arisen at precise moments in time.65 Affording respect is 
relatively easy.66  
Forum state courts sometimes apply their own parentage laws where there 
were no such earlier parentage determinations, although foreign state courts 
could have made such determinations if asked about what occurred in their 
borders. Thus, where the relevant foreign state parentage laws are 
imprecise, as with doctrines like de facto parenthood, equitable adoption, 
and rescindable voluntary paternity acknowledgements, forum state courts 
will often utilize their own laws even though all or most of the relevant 
acts occurred elsewhere. Because foreign state policies are not afforded 
respect, undesirable forum shopping is encouraged and uncertainty about 
initial or continuing legal parentage frequently reigns.67  
                                                                                                             
 64. Besides respecting judicial orders in, for example, marriage dissolution 
or paternity cases as per the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063 (1994), courts must afford respect to some 
judicial-type initiatives having the force and effect of court judgments, like 
voluntary paternity acknowledgments. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12(5) 
(West 2009) (purpose of an unwed biological father’s acknowledgment is to 
establish “legally . . . the biological father and child relationship”); 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 45/6(b) (West 2009) (voluntary acknowledgment has “full force and 
effect of a judgment”). 
 65. See Parness, Handling Imprecise Parentage, supra note 14, at 403–12 
(contrasting precise and imprecise parentage laws). 
 66. Of course, legal parentage can be determined for a number of purposes. 
A determination of parentage in one state for child support purposes does not 
warrant respect in a second state where the issue involves the male parent’s ability 
to veto a proposed adoption where paternity norms differ in the two settings. See, 
e.g., Adoption of A.S., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding New York 
order of filiation for child support purposes only establishes biological ties which 
prompt support duties, and not parentage, leading to adoption veto powers).  
 67. Failure to utilize imprecise foreign state parentage law is sometimes 
justifiable, as when a foreign state court refuses to exercise jurisdiction and there 
is a significant relationship between the forum and the parties interested in 
parentage. See, e.g., H.O. v. Utah, 122 P.3d 686, 689 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Utah 
court employs Utah parental rights termination standards to parent living in 
Arizona, where Utah is “the state with the most significant relationship to the 
children and the proceedings to terminate parental rights” and where “the Arizona 
court declined jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding.”).  
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Imprecise American state parentage laws abound, originating both in 
statutes68 and judicial precedents69 and such laws can carry differing 
doctrinal names while having similar requirements to establish and 
disestablish parentage.70 These laws can designate parentage not only as 
de facto parenthood and equitable adoption, but also as psychological 
parent, parent by estoppel, presumed parenthood, in loco parentis parent, 
and equitable parent.71 The same doctrinal name can have different 
meanings from state to state. For example, a de facto parent, perhaps 
surprisingly, sometimes encompasses a parent on par with a birth or 
adoptive mother or a biological or adoptive father.72 A de facto parent also 
sometimes encompasses a nonparent who has third party standing to seek 
a childcare order over parental objection.73 As well, different doctrinal 
names can have comparable meanings,74 as with de facto parent, equitable 
parent, parent by estoppel, and presumed parenthood.75 A de facto parent 
generally includes a parent on equal footing with a biological or a formal 
adoptive parent, whether arising under statute or precedent, regardless of 
the doctrinal name employed.  
Beyond their names, the degrees of imprecision of state de facto parent 
laws vary from state to state. Some de facto parent laws are more objective, 
as with laws following the Uniform Parentage Act,76 which requires a two-
year residence and a “holding out” of a child as one’s own to establish 
                                                                                                             
 68. See Parness, Handling Imprecise Parentage, supra note 14, at 403–12; 
Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 12, at 752–63. 
 69. See Parness, Handling Imprecise Parentage, supra note 14, at 403–12; 
Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 12, at 752–63. 
 70. See generally Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 12 
(providing a general review, and comparison, of American state parentage laws). 
 71. Id. at 762, 764 n.102.  
 72. Id. at 769 n.137.  
 73. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8–201(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (West Supp. 
2015) (providing for de facto parenthood, on equal footing with biological or 
adoptive parenthood, where one had a “parent-like relationship” and “acted in a 
parental role”), with D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2009) (providing that de facto parent 
can seek “third-party custody” if he or she lived with a child since birth).  
 74. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8–201(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (2015) 
(providing for de facto parenthood, on equal footing with biological or adoptive 
parenthood, where one had a “parent-like relationship” and “acted in a parental 
role”), with ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2009) (providing that one is a 
“presumed parent” if, “while the child is under the age of majority, he receives 
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child or 
otherwise openly holds out the child as his natural child and establishes a 
significant parental relationship with the child by providing emotional and 
financial support for the child”).  
 75. For a review of imprecise American state parentage laws, both via statutes 
and precedents, see Parness, Handling Imprecise Parentage, supra note 14, at 
403–12.  
 76. UPA, supra note 25, § 204(a)(5).  
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parentage.77 Others are more subjective, as with laws that require a bonded 
or dependent or parental-type relationship.78  
Many cases illustrate how the courts determine which de facto 
parentage law to apply and how the state courts fail to recognize choice-of-
law issues. In too many cases involving multistate acts, courts neglect to 
consider the unique and legitimate interests of foreign state governments 
that prompted their imprecise parentage laws and the reasonable 
expectations of those who provide parental-like childcare. At times, courts 
simply apply forum laws without justifying their choices, sometimes aided 
by parties who fail to seek a choice-of-law analysis.  
III. EXEMPLARY CASES INVOLVING RESPECT FOR EARLIER 
PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS 
American Courts facing claims implicating legal parentage generally 
respect parentage determinations made elsewhere. Such earlier 
determinations can be made in a number of ways, including through court 
cases, voluntary parentage acknowledgments, and marital parentage 
presumptions.  
A. Respect in Home State Child Support Cases 
Where a child has resided in a state for more than six months, a court 
in that state can initially establish child support obligations for a parent 
also living in the state.79 In doing so, however, the home state court must 
respect a parentage determination made earlier in another state where the 
court did not consider child support.80 While federal statutory law obliges 
a state court generally to apply its own laws in a proceeding to establish a 
child support order,81 its own laws can include its choice-of-law rules, 
because the Full Faith and Credit Clause dictates that respect be given to 
a parentage determination made in another state.82 Such foreign state 
                                                                                                             
 77. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204(A)(5) (West 2013); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-20-10(1)(e) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700–204(A)(5) 
(West 2009). 
 78. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8–201(c) (West Supp. 2015) 
(providing for de facto parenthood). But see Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 
750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding that there can be no de facto parenthood when 
there are already two fit parents as otherwise due process privacy rights of existing 
parents are unduly compromised). 
 79. 28 U.S.C. §1738(B) (2012).  
 80. Id.  
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(1).  
 82. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1. 
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parentage determinations are perhaps infrequent, however, as child 
support rulings usually accompany initial parentage rulings.83  
B. Respect in Child Support Cases in Responding Tribunals 
When established child support obligors—but not custodial parents—
move interstate, their support obligations often are enforced in the courts 
of their new residences. Personal jurisdiction is assured in those courts, as 
the parties are residents subject to suit in their state of residency. In these 
enforcement proceedings, the UIFSA “responding” tribunals must respect 
the child support and underlying parentage orders entered elsewhere.84 In 
doing so, the UIFSA bars these tribunals from entertaining a defense of 
nonparentage.85 Further, the UIFSA usually prohibits those tribunals from 
entertaining claims by these obligors for parenting time, visitation, or 
custody.86 
C. Respect in Childcare Disputes 
Later childcare disputes in the forum state also employ earlier parentage 
determinations by other state courts.87 Berwick v. Wagner, a Texas child 
custody proceeding, involved a child born to a gestational surrogate in 
California.88 Jerry Berwick and Richard Wagner married in Canada in 
2003.89 They registered as domestic partners in California in 2005, but 
                                                                                                             
 83. But see State ex rel. N.G. v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 
No. 101425 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014) (respecting man’s parentage arising 
under earlier Virginia home state ruling on “allocation of parental rights”).  
 84. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1. 
 85. See, e.g., Reid v. Dixon, 524 S.E.2d 576, 577 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(relying upon N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52C-3-314 (1995)); see also State v. Hanson, 
725 So. 2d 514, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that to contest paternity 
established in Iowa that led to Iowa child support order sought to be enforced in 
Louisiana, Louisiana child support obligor “must return to the forum that rendered 
the judgment on paternity”).  
 86. See, e.g., State ex rel. R.L.H., 942 P.2d 1386 (Colo. App. 1997); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5-314(a), 14-5-701(b) (West 2005).  
 87. No respect is given, however, to earlier childcare judgments wherein the 
courts lacked jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pecoraro v. Rostagno-Wallat, 805 N.W.2d 
226 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (no respect for New York filiation proceeding 
declaring filiation in biological father where child was born to a married couple 
in Michigan and where New York court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
husband); In re Marriage of Dedie, 255 P.3d 1142 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (no 
respect for New York child custody modification order where New York court 
lacked jurisdiction); In re L.S., 257 P.3d 201 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (no respect 
for Nebraska custody decree where there was no subject matter jurisdiction).  
 88. Berwick v. Wagner, No. 01–12–00872–CV, 2014 WL 4493470 (Tex. 
App. Sept. 11, 2014).  
 89. Id. at *1. 
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lived in Houston, Texas.90 In 2005, they entered into a gestational 
surrogacy agreement with a woman in California to carry a child for 
them.91 She was implanted with embryos formed from Berwick’s sperm 
and from donated ova.92 The result was the birth of a son, C.B.W.93  
A California court entered a Judgment of Paternity before C.B.W.’s 
birth, and declared both Berwick and Wagner a “legal parent” of C.B.W.94 
The court also found that the surrogate and her husband were not legal 
parents,95 and further ordered the hospital to list Berwick in the space 
provided for father on the child’s birth certificate and Wagner in the space 
provided for mother.96  
Berwick ended his relationship with Wagner in 2008.97 Berwick later 
married a woman, telling Wagner that they could no longer co-parent 
C.B.W., saying Wagner needed to “move on and ‘get his own family’ and 
‘his own little boy.’”98 Wagner then petitioned for joint managing 
conservatorship custody of C.B.W. in a Texas court in 2008, and 
separately sought to register the California Judgment of Paternity in 
Texas.99 Over Berwick’s objection, the trial court confirmed the California 
judgment, giving Wagner standing to seek custody.100 A jury trial was held 
after Berwick’s unsuccessful appeal from the order confirming the 
registration.101 Upon a jury verdict appointing Wagner as sole managing 
conservator and Berwick as possessory conservator, Berwick appealed 
again.102  
On appeal, Berwick argued that the registration of the California 
judgment in Texas “does not mean that it is enforceable” because the 
registration was “contrary to Texas law,” under which a child can have 
only one legal father.103 Berwick also contended that the gestational 
surrogacy agreement was void under Texas law because Texas did not 
recognize the parties’ same-sex marriage.104 Texas law provides that 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. (noting that their relationship ran from 1994 to 2008).  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (noting that after C.B.W.’s birth, Berwick and Wagner “lived together 
as a family for several years” in Houston).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at *16–18.  
 99. Id. at *1.  
 100. Id. at *2.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at *3; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201 (West 2014).  
 104. Berwick, 2014 WL 4493470, at *3. 
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surrogacy agreements are enforceable only if the intended parents are 
married to each other.105  
The Texas appellate court held that the California Judgment of Paternity 
was entitled to full faith and credit “without regard to public policy 
concerns” involving Texas laws.106 The court recalled that in Berwick’s 
earlier appeal, the court had held that the parties’ California Judgment of 
Paternity declaring Wagner to be a legal parent was properly registered in 
Texas and that the California court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment.107  
The case of Park v. Bailey108 demonstrates comparable deference to 
another state’s paternity judgment, which the respecting court could not 
enter if all relevant conduct occurred in the foreign state. In Park, an 
unwed biological father obtained a paternity judgment in Alabama in a 
childcare dispute involving a proposed adoption in Georgia.109 The 
Georgia court respected the Alabama paternity judgment although the 
Alabama ruling technically did not comply with Georgia adoption law 
norms on a father’s veto power over a proposed adoption.110 
The Berwick and Park rulings demonstrate how a court in a childcare 
dispute will respect the parentage determination made elsewhere even 
when all relevant conduct occurred within its borders and even if the court 
itself could not make such a determination. 
D. Respect in Marital Parentage Presumption Cases 
State laws, chiefly through statutes, recognize marital parentage 
presumptions on behalf of the male—and sometimes the female—spouses 
of birth parents.111 Spousal relationships must exist when birth, conception, 
or pregnancy occurs.112 In this situation, the presumptions arise at precise 
moments.113 Where birth, conception, or pregnancy occur in one state, and 
the parties argue for the presumed spousal parentage arising from that event 
for the first time in a second state, a court in the second state will often 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b)).  
 106. Id. at *6.  
 107. Id.  
 108. 765 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (Alabama paternity judgment 
standards substantially followed the Georgia legitimation norms). 
 109. Id. at 723. 
 110. Id. at 725. 
 111. See Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 12, at 757–58.  
 112. Id. at 756–57. 
 113. Id. (at birth, at time of conception, or during pregnancy). 
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defer to the marital presumption laws of the first state, though the court in 
the first state never judicially recognized such a presumption.114  
In a trusteeship case decided in Minnesota in 2004, a Minnesota court 
respected a Florida marital parentage presumption, although the presumption 
had never been formally recognized in a Florida judicial proceeding.115 In that 
case, a man, JHM, created three irrevocable trusts by 1980 to benefit his 
children, the combined value of which was approximately $900 million.116 
In 1979, JHM married PAM, his third wife.117 JHM and PAM divorced in 
1991.118 During the marriage, PAM gave birth to DHM in 1983, CWM in 
1985 and ACM in 1987.119 The birth certificates of each of these children 
listed JHM as the father.120  
Before a Florida court granted the 1991 divorce, JHM had earlier filed 
for divorce, in 1986, wherein he challenged the paternity of DHM and 
CWM.121 But this 1986 suit was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.122 
In 1989, the trustees of a fourth trust distributed trust assets to all of JHM’s 
children, including DHM, CWM, and ACM.123 That trust was to benefit 
all of JHM’s “children,” defined by the trust to include all of JHM’s “legal 
issue and all adopted children.”124  
In the 1991 divorce proceeding in Florida, the court deemed the three 
children born to PAM during her marriage to JHM “children of the 
marriage” per a settlement agreement.125 The agreement also stated that 
these three children “shall share equally and no differently” in his assets 
and in the trusts for his benefit, just like JHM’s children from his first two 
marriages or from any later marriage.126  
In 1997, the trustees of the three trusts undertook an investigation into 
“proper trust beneficiaries.”127 They found that “there is a basis to 
reasonably conclude that PAM’s children are not JHM’s children.”128 In 
2000, the trustees petitioned a Minnesota court to identify the “proper 
                                                                                                             
 114. See, e.g., In re Trusteeship of Trust Created Under Trust Agreement 
Dated Dec. 31, 1974, 674 N.W.2d 222, 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. 
Simons, 336 P.3d 557, 566 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). 
 115. In re Trusteeship, 674 N.W.2d at 229. 
 116. Id. at 225.  
 117. Id. at 226.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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beneficiaries,” as each of the three trusts was situated in Minnesota.129 The 
trustees asserted that “blood or saliva testing could be used” to test 
biological ties, urging that any beneficiary of the subject trusts “must be a 
biological descendant of JHM.”130 PAM and her three children born during 
her marriage to JHM resisted.131 In 2003, the trial court held that the three 
children were not biologically tied to JHM for purposes of the three trusts 
as required to benefit, though the children could later submit to genetic 
testing.132  
The appeals court ruled, inter alia that the trustees had no standing “to 
challenge . . . paternity by bringing a collateral attack of a preexisting 
adjudication of parentage made consistent with applicable parentage 
laws.”133 The Minnesota court deemed the Florida divorce decree binding 
on the trustees as the Florida courts had consistently “applied the principle 
that a divorce decree which establishes the paternity of a child is a final 
determination of paternity.”134 
Further, even if no settlement pact had expressly designated JHM as 
the father of PAM’s children born during the marriage, the Florida law on 
marital parentage presumptions could have operated to bar the trustees. 
The Minnesota appeals court expressly recognized that Florida “courts 
maintain ‘the presumption that a child born in wedlock is the blood issue 
of the partners of such marriage.’”135  
Similarly, an Oregon court applied the marital parentage presumption 
of Louisiana in a 2014 decision.136 In that case, no earlier agreement as to 
parentage and no explicit acknowledgment of parentage had occurred 
during the Louisiana divorce.137 The state of Oregon brought suit against 
Alton Simons, an Oregon resident, for child support payments.138 Simons 
was married to and living with the child’s mother in Louisiana at the time 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. at 226–27. 
 130. Id. at 227. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 227–28. 
 133. Id. at 228. 
 134. Id. at 230; cf. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Mitchell, 12 A.3d 179 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2011) (holding that, in a child support modification proceeding, the UIFSA 
prohibited a collateral attack in Maryland, based on nonbiological parentage, by a 
former husband on a New York divorce decree declaring the children to be “of the 
marriage” and ordering him to pay child support).  
 135. In re Trusteeship, 674 N.W.2d at 229. Incidentally, the Minnesota court 
explicitly found that even if the paternity of the three children had not been 
established per the 1991 Florida dissolution decree, the trustees would have been 
foreclosed under Florida law from challenging the paternity of the three children. 
Id. at 232. 
 136. State v. Simons, 336 P.3d 557 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). 
 137. Id. at 562. 
 138. Id. at 559. 
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of birth139 and was named on the birth certificate issued in Louisiana.140 
But in the Louisiana dissolution judgment, the court made no mention of 
Simons’ paternity of the child in question, though the court deemed two 
other children born during the marriage to be children of the marriage.141  
In resisting Oregon’s pursuit of support for the one child who was still 
living with the mother in Louisiana, Simons urged he “is not J’s biological 
father.”142 Oregon responded that both the Louisiana birth certificate and 
the Louisiana marital parentage presumption made Simons the child’s 
father.143 The court applied an Oregon statute, driven by the UIFSA, and 
found that no nonparentage defense was available, as Simons’ parentage 
had been “previously determined by or pursuant to law.”144 The Oregon 
court noted other instances where parentage “arises by operation of law” 
in Oregon, including a filing of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, 
a marriage of the parents after birth, and a consent to artificial 
insemination.145 Although acknowledging that it was bound to apply 
Oregon’s “own procedural and substantive law,”146 the Oregon appeals 
court nevertheless determined that Louisiana law guided the defense of 
nonparentage because “Simons’s paternity has been previously 
determined by operation of Louisiana law.”147 Seemingly applicable, 
Oregon common law included a choice-of-law rule demanding that the 
court apply another state’s parentage law.148  
The Oregon court also noted that, per the UIFSA, parentage may 
operate by law where one “publicly” acknowledges “a duty of support 
after receiving” a child into the home.149 Under Louisiana law, Simons’ 
defense, involving a disavowal of a marital paternity presumption, was 
unavailable to Simons because the relevant statutory time period had 
expired. The Louisiana divorce decree was not itself a disavowal, and 
Simons failed to meet the Louisiana procedures for disavowal petitions.150  
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. at 558–59. 
 140. Id. at 559. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 560. 
 144. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 110.381 (West 2003)).  
 145. Id. at 561; see also Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 146. Simons, 337 P.3d at 562 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 110.348).  
 147. Id. at 564. 
 148. See id. at 566 (agreeing with the state that in determining whether a 
defense of nonparentage may be raised, the governing law is the law of the state 
where the parentage of the child is asserted to have been “previously 
determined”). 
 149. Id. at 564 n.10 (citing UIFSA, supra note 1, § 315 cmt.). 
 150. Id. at 563. 
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In both the Minnesota and Oregon cases, foreign state marital 
presumption laws were recognized as relevant because the acts prompting 
the presumptions—that is marriage and birth—occurred in other states and 
at precise points in time.  
E. Respect in Voluntary Paternity Acknowledgment Cases 
Voluntary paternity acknowledgments undertaken in one state 
typically are respected in the courts of other states hearing legal parentage 
issues.151 Under federal welfare assistance laws, states participating in the 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program must make voluntary 
acknowledgment affidavit procedures available and must “give full faith 
and credit to such an affidavit signed in any other State according to its 
procedures.”152 State statutes typically reflect this demand. An Illinois 
statute is illustrative of this point and provides:  
Establishments of paternity made under the laws of other states 
shall be given full faith and credit in this State regardless of 
whether paternity was established through voluntary 
acknowledgment, tests to determine inherited characteristics, or 
judicial or administrative processes.153 
Likewise, an Ohio statute states:  
A court that is determining a parent and child relationship 
pursuant to this chapter shall give full faith and credit to a 
parentage determination made under the laws of this state or 
another state, regardless of whether the parentage determination 
was made pursuant to a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, 
an administrative procedure, or a court proceeding.154 
                                                                                                             
 151. They are also respected in federal courts. See, e.g., Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Jones, 771 F.3d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 2014) (respecting Illinois acknowledgment and 
acknowledgment rescission standards). 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(c)(iv) (2012). See, e.g., Burden v. Burden, 945 A.2d 
656 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (reviewing federal laws and finding respect may be 
required; in the case the acknowledgment recession standards in South Dakota and 
Maryland led to the same result). Federal district courts, per the so-called Erie 
Doctrine, must also credit state voluntary parentage acknowledgments where 
parentage issues arise from state law claims; see, e.g., Jones, 771 F.3d at 389 
(respecting signed acknowledgment for six year old child that led to “order of 
parentage” in dispute over life insurance proceeds).  
 153. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/27 (West 2009).  
 154. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02(B) (West 2011).  
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In re Mary G.,155 a 2007 California child dependency proceeding, 
demonstrates the application of these statutory policies. The California court 
used an earlier Michigan affidavit of paternity to establish a child support 
order and was given full faith and credit.156 Such deferential policies are 
recognized in the Uniform Parentage Act, which says: “A court of this State 
shall give full faith and credit to an acknowledgment of paternity or denial 
of paternity effective in another State if the acknowledgment or denial has 
been signed and is otherwise in compliance with the law of the other 
State.”157 
In the case In Re Ayden K.M., a Tennessee appeals court deemed 
Tennessee courts bound by a voluntary paternity acknowledgment signed in 
Texas by a man and the birth mother after the child’s birth in Texas.158 After 
signing the acknowledgment, the birth mother moved to Tennessee and the 
man to Idaho, with the birth mother thereafter seeking to overturn the man’s 
“designation as father” in a later Tennessee child custody proceeding.159 In 
ruling this way, the Tennessee appeals court bound the courts in Tennessee 
to any Texas court ruling that overturned acknowledgments in any later or 
continuing Tennessee child custody case.160  
F. Respect in Other Initial Child Support Cases 
Where a child has not resided in a particular state for more than six 
months, and where an infant has not resided in that state since birth, a court 
in the state of residency of the child and custodial parent may nevertheless 
initially establish the child support obligations of another parent also living 
in the state.161 In doing so, the state court must often respect a parentage 
determination made in another state where there has been no consideration 
of child support.162 In that scenario, state choice-of-law rules prompted by 
                                                                                                             
 155. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 156. Id. at 715. 
 157. UPA, supra note 25, § 311. The comment to section 311 recognizes that 
federal statutes require these policies for the states receiving federal welfare 
assistance. See id. § 311 cmt. 
 158. 382 S.W.3d 354, 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 159. Id. at 354. 
 160. Id. at 357–58 (suggesting that a Texas court could not have decided the 
issue of custody, because the petitioning father was then living in Idaho and the 
birth mother and child in Tennessee); cf. In re Gendron, 950 A.2d 151 (N.H. 2008) 
(holding that a New Hampshire woman could not challenge man’s voluntary 
parentage acknowledgment in Massachusetts during a custodial dispute in a New 
Hampshire court).  
 161. Here, there can be personal jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 
720 (1878) (residency prompts personal jurisdiction in a convenient forum).  
 162. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1. Such a determination may occur, for example, 
with a birth certificate notation. 
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause can dictate such respect.163 Such a forum 
state determination of a child support will be unnecessary where a child 
support order accompanied an initial determination of parentage.164 
IV. EXEMPLARY CASES ON CHOOSING WHICH IMPRECISE 
PARENTAGE LAWS APPLY 
A. Choice of Law in Initial Child Support Cases in Home State Courts 
Custodial parents or governmental welfare agencies seeking 
reimbursements for child welfare payments can present initial child support 
cases in the home states of children for whom child support is sought. In this 
situation, a child’s home state is the state where, while living with a parent 
or a person acting as a parent, the child lived for at least six consecutive 
months immediately preceding the time of filing, or “if a child is less than 6 
months old,” the state where the child “lived from birth.”165 In initial home 
state child support cases, federal law dictates that state courts generally 
apply forum laws on issues of parentage when parentage has not been earlier 
determined in a way commanding respect.166 
B. Choice of Law in Initial Child Support Cases in Responding Tribunals 
When child support is initially sought in a responding tribunal, choice-
of-law parentage issues can arise where the alleged obligee resides in the 
forum state, but the obligor does not. Responding tribunals are chiefly 
employed in initial child support cases when the alleged obligor cannot be 
sued in the child’s home state due to a lack of residence therein and due to 
a lack of personal jurisdiction.167 Forum law is demanded in these 
                                                                                                             
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. Here, there is full faith and credit to the foreign state parentage and 
support orders, as can occur in a paternity lawsuit. 
 165. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(b) (2012); see also UIFSA, supra note 1, § 102; 42 
U.S.C. § 666(f) (2012). 
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(1). 
 167. Initial parentage cases may not need to employ responding tribunals as 
compared to child support cases, as where termination of parental rights or 
interests are at issue. There, a child’s home state might provide a legitimate forum 
though an alleged defending parent or nonparent is without residence or other 
contacts supporting in personam jurisdiction there. Status or in rem personal 
jurisdiction can be used when authorized by state law. See, e.g., In re R.W., 39 
A.3d 682, 693−94 (Vt. 2011). The Vermont Supreme Court distinguished initial 
child custody cases and did not address them, id. at 693 n.4, presumably because 
of cases like May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), which held that an Ohio court 
cannot respect an order on custodial parental rights of the mother regarding 
visitation under a Wisconsin court decree where in personam jurisdiction did not 
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instances where the responding tribunals are hearing the initial child 
support case and where the responding tribunal has not earlier determined 
parentage questions in a way commanding respect.168  
In Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Carlin, a 2001 case from 
Hawaii, a Puerto Rican mother alleged that a male Hawaiian fathered her 
child.169 The alleged father specifically denied that he was the child’s 
“presumed father.”170 Any presumed parentage was not litigated, however, as 
testing in Hawaii established the respondent’s biological ties.171 Assuming no 
male biological ties, had the mother urged that a child support order in Hawaii 
could be based on de facto parentage, challenging choice of law issues may 
have arisen. The two governments, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, might have 
approached de facto parentage differently. While many of the relevant facts 
might have occurred in Puerto Rico, a Hawaiian court might be asked to use 
its own de facto parentage law.172  
C. Choice of Law in Initial Childcare Cases 
In In re Marriage of Mancine, an Illinois marriage dissolution 
proceeding, both the husband, Nicholas Gansner, and his wife, Miki 
Loveland Mancine, sought custody of a minor, William, born in August 
2008.173 Miki adopted William in Wisconsin in March of 2009, before her 
marriage to Nicholas in May of 2009, though the parties had contemplated 
a pre-adoption wedding.174 Miki already had another adopted child, 
                                                                                                             
exist in Wisconsin. The May decision was reviewed in In re R.W., 39 A.3d at 692, 
which recognized “fragmented nature of the court’s reasoning” in May. There is 
also comparable uncertainty over whether a trial court may issue an abuse 
prevention order on behalf of its resident plaintiff where there is no traditional 
basis for in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Fox v. Fox, 106 
A.3d 919, 923−27 (Vt. 2014) (reviewing cases and declining “to carve out a 
blanket exemption from the constitutional due process requirement of personal 
jurisdiction for requests for final [relief from abuse] orders”).  
 168. UIFSA, supra note 1, § 303(2); 42 U.S.C. § 666(f).  
 169. 31 P.3d 230, 233 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 234 (respondent admitted paternity “based upon the genetic test 
results”).  
 172. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-4(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that “[a] 
man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if . . . [w]hile the child is under 
the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the 
child as his natural child . . . .”); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 461 (West, Westlaw 
through Dec. 2001) (presumed parentage for men only when arising from 
marriage or when there is a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity).  
 173. In re Marriage of Mancine, 965 N.E.2d 592, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
 174. Id. at 594 (“Miki and Nicholas decided they would marry in 
approximately June or July of 2008. . . . William [the child involved in the custody 
dispute] was born on August 5, 2008 . . . . Nicholas and Miki became formally 
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Elizabeth, who earlier lived with Miki and her ex-husband, John Mancine.175 
Under Wisconsin law, an unmarried couple cannot adopt a child, but a single 
woman can adopt.176 Within a month of William’s birth, Nicholas and Miki 
“had moved in” together in Wisconsin and “Nicholas . . . was co-parenting 
William.”177  
An adoption agent in Wisconsin advised Nicholas that he could adopt 
William as a stepparent after the marriage.178 William’s birth certificate 
did reflect Nicholas’s last name, although Nicholas married Miki in 
Wisconsin about two months after William’s adoption was finalized.179 
Nicholas had moved in with Miki at least nine months before the wedding 
and was co-parenting at their home.180 About three months before the 
wedding, Miki named Nicholas “as the [child’s] sole guardian” by Miki in 
                                                                                                             
engaged in December 2008.”). The appellate court’s factual account is derived 
chiefly from trial court pleadings and affidavits on which there was no trial but 
little party disagreement. Id. The appellate court briefs reveal, however, other 
facts disputed by the parties, disagreements that evidently were unimportant to 
case’s resolution. For example, Miki and Nicholas disagreed on why Nicholas got 
a vasectomy. Compare Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 2, In Re Marriage of 
Mancine, 9 N.E.3d 550 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 10-D-9394) [hereinafter 
Appellant Brief] (because Nicholas believed “that he would be William’s father 
forever,” he got a vasectomy), with Response Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 13–
14, In Re Marriage of Mancine, 9 N.E.3d 550 (No. 10-D-9394) [hereinafter 
Appellee Brief] (urging that the vasectomy was prompted because Nicholas “did 
not want to pass on his genetic material for his mental illness (depression, et. 
cetera),” while noting that the vasectomy was not mentioned in Nicholas’s trial 
court pleadings or his affidavit). The parties also disagreed on whether “Miki 
engaged in pathological extramarital sexual behavior” and prostitution during her 
marriage to Nicholas. Compare Appellant Brief, supra, at 22, with Appellee Brief, 
supra, at 11–12. The briefs also reveal additional factual assertions which seem 
undisputed, but outside the appellate court opinion. See, e.g., Appellant Brief, 
supra, at 5 (stating that Nicholas and Miki had their first date in the spring of 
2008, a few days before Miki and John Mancine officially divorced; even then, 
Nicholas knew of soon-to-be William’s adoption, and of Elizabeth); id. at 6–7 
(stating that Nicholas and Miki accompanied William’s birth mother to the 
hospital “and were with her in the delivery room”).  
 175. Marriage of Mancine, 965 N.E.2d at 594 (stating when Miki and Nicholas 
began dating in the Spring of 2008, Elizabeth—Miki’s adopted daughter—was 
one year old and Miki was separated from her then-husband, John Mancine; Miki 
and Nicholas had at one time planned to marry in June or July of 2008). 
 176. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.82 (West 2008)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (noting that William, the adopted child, was born in August 2008; his 
adoption by Miki was finalized in Wisconsin on March 4, 2009; Miki and 
Nicholas were married in May 2009).  
 180. Id. (explaining that William was born in August 2008 and was living with 
Miki and Nicholas in a single home by early September 2008).  
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prospective adoption papers, though evidently not in a court proceeding.181 
Nicholas and Miki were named as parents on William’s baptism record 
about seven months before the wedding.182 
About a month after the wedding, a Wisconsin adoption agency said 
it would support a stepparent adoption.183 Approximately a year later, a 
Wisconsin agency told Nicholas that he was free to file his petition for 
stepparent adoption, but he refrained from doing so.184 At that time, 
Nicholas and Miki would adopt a third child, Henry.185 Nicholas primarily 
cared for all the children in the household because only Miki was 
working.186 When Nicholas began working, he continued the childcare.187 
According to Nicholas, Miki held the couple and all the children out as a 
family unit, and even used his last name of Gansner.188  
Miki sought a divorce in Illinois about 15 months into the marriage, 
after the entire family had moved to Illinois to be closer to Miki’s 
parents.189 Miki challenged Nicholas’s standing to seek custody of 
William, as Nicholas had never formally adopted William.190 Because the 
family had lived in Illinois for more than six months, both the trial191 and 
appellate192 courts employed Illinois law.193 The Illinois courts did not 
consider, as Illinois statutory law allowed, whether jurisdiction over the 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id. (“Miki named Nicholas as the sole guardian of William and any future 
child she has, and named her parents as alternate guardians.”). 
 182. Id. (noting that the baptism occurred in November 2008 and the wedding 
occurred in May 2009).  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 594−95 (an August 2010 email to Nicholas).  
 185. Id. at 595. 
 186. Id. (when Henry was adopted in September of 2009, Nicholas and Miki 
moved the household to Chicago). 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. (“According to Nicholas, Miki always held out William as Nicholas’ 
child and held out herself, Nicholas, Elizabeth, William and Henry as ‘the Gansner 
family.’”). Two months after seeking to divorce Nicholas, Miki petitioned to change 
William’s last name to Mancine, her first husband’s last name. Appellant Brief, 
supra note 174, at 1 n.1.  
 189. Marriage of Mancine, 965 N.E.2d at 595 (dissolution sought on 
September 24, 2010).  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. (explaining that the trial court dismissed the claims because “Nicholas 
lacked standing”).  
 192. Id. at 596 (explaining that the appellate court dismissed the claims 
because “Nicholas’ arguments are not well grounded”).  
 193. The Illinois courts perhaps employed Illinois—rather than Wisconsin—
parentage laws because William’s “home state” was Illinois. 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 36/102(7) (West 2009) (defining “home state” as “state in which a 
child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive 
months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding”). 
Yet home state status may speak only to jurisdiction and not to choice of law.  
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“child custody determination should be declined because a Wisconsin 
court would be a more appropriate forum.”194  
The appeals court found that Nicholas lacked standing as to William,195 
rejecting the “equitable parent,” “equitable estoppel,” “equitable adoption,” 
and parens patriae arguments under Illinois law,196 which barred Miki from 
challenging Nicholas’s standing.197 The court ruled without ever 
considering the possible application of Wisconsin law.198 Wisconsin 
common law does recognize a comparable parentage doctrine, called 
equitable adoption.199 The law on equitable adoption, however, was 
unclear; its application from the inheritance setting to the childcare setting 
was uncertain. Further, equitable adoption was not employed in a 
Wisconsin proceeding involving William’s parentage. The Illinois 
Supreme Court assumed that Illinois law governed William’s parentage.200  
                                                                                                             
 194. Id. at § 207. 
 195. Marriage of Mancine, 965 N.E. 2d at 602. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 596−602.  
 199. See, e.g., Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 641−42 (Wis. 2004) 
(precluding the use of “the equitable parent doctrine,” the court allows “equitable 
estoppel” to “address those instances where unfairness in a proceeding would 
harm children and adults, absent the intervention of the court’s equitable 
powers”); Hendrick v. Hendrick, 765 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“[T]he focus of a proceeding seeking to determine a child’s paternity is whether 
the ‘best interests’ of the child would be served thereby.”). But see In re Paternity 
of Christian R.H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 233−34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that 
while there is common law authority to order child “visitation,” there is no 
nonstatutory authority to confer “parental rights”). Had William been formally 
adopted by Nicholas under Wisconsin law, the Mancine court would likely have 
deferred to Wisconsin adoption law. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/27 
(West 2009) (recognizing full faith and credit to paternity establishments in other 
states when done “through voluntary acknowledgment, tests to determine 
inherited characteristics, or judicial or administrative processes”); see also Port v. 
Cowan, 44 A.3d 970 (Md. 2012) (stating that, under the doctrine of comity, 
Maryland allows same-sex couples who wed in a civil ceremony in California to 
divorce in Maryland though a same-sex marriage was not then allowed in 
Maryland, where same-sex marriage was also not explicitly deemed by the 
Maryland legislature as void or unenforceable). On when “home state” law may 
not be applied (e.g., so that a Mancine court would apply Wisconsin law), see 
example, Castro v. Castro, 818 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 2012) (remanded for a hearing 
as to forum’s inconvenience under North Dakota law (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
14.1-18 (West 2008))). 
 200. Given the lack of clarity, the high court denied review, but in a 
supervisory order directed the appeals court to reconsider its holding in light of 
the Supreme Court’s recent use of equitable adoption in an inheritance case. 
Mancine v. Gansner, 992 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2013). Upon reconsideration, the appeals 
court again declined to “apply the concept of equitable adoption in the context of 
statutory proceedings on adoption, parentage and divorce” as that “would 
undermine the entire family law structure enacted by . . . [the] legislature and 
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Initial childcare cases can involve adoption as well as divorce. In the 
context of adoption, courts can apply their own laws to determine the 
parentage of children placed for adoption. These courts sometimes deftly 
avoid a choice of parentage law analysis that would undermine an adoption 
that is deemed desirable. In a 2014 New York adoption proceeding, twins 
were born to a surrogate mother in India and were quickly moved to New 
York to live with the “birth parent.”201 The court granted the petition for 
adoption although the surrogacy contract would have been illegal if 
undertaken in New York.202 The court effectively recognized the sperm 
donor’s parentage under New York law and failed to explore Indian law, 
deeming the “surrogacy contract’s legality . . . of no consequence.”203  
Initial childcare decisions requiring parentage determinations can 
involve other matters. For example, parentage determinations are necessary 
in cases involving assisted reproduction outside of surrogacy. Consider a 
birth mother undertaking an assisted reproduction procedure in one state but 
maintaining child custody in a second state. The sperm donor then argues 
for parentage and childcare opportunities in the second state. In 2007, the 
Kansas Supreme Court in In re K.M.H. utilized an interest analysis derived 
from Kansas choice-of-law precedents204 and found that the Kansas statute 
on assisted reproduction applied. Distinguishing the Adams precedent from 
Illinois,205 the court observed:  
The facts of this case bear little resemblance to the facts of Adams. 
Here, the parties are Kansas residents. Whatever agreement that 
existed between the parties was arrived at in Kansas, where they 
exchanged promises supported by consideration, and D.H. 
literally delivered on his promise by giving his sperm to S.H. The 
twins were born in Kansas and reside in Kansas. The only fact 
tying any of the participants to Missouri is the location of the 
clinic where the insemination was performed.  
                                                                                                             
create uncertainty and protracted litigation.” Marriage of Mancine, 9 N.E.3d at 
554−55. A comparable Illinois Supreme Court supervisory order was issued in In 
re Scarlett Z.-D., 975 N.E.2d 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). On reconsideration, that 
appeals court, again applying only Illinois law, found “equitable adoption . . . 
might present a potentially viable theory” upon which an unwed father could 
“assert standing” to seek childcare of his former girlfriend’s adopted child. In re 
Scarlett Z.-D., 11 N.E.3d 360, 384 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Scarlett Z.-D. was heard 
again by the Illinois Supreme Court, 28 N.E.3d 776 (Ill. 2015), which rejected the 
unwed father’s standing to seek custody or visitation, per equitable adoption or de 
facto parenthood, over the adoptive mother’s objection.  
 201. In re J.J, 984 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Queens 2014).  
 202. Id. 842.  
 203. Id. at 847.  
 204. In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007). 
 205. Id. at 1032.  
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Under these circumstances, we hold that Kansas law applies and 
that significant contacts and a significant aggregation of contacts 
with Kansas make application of our law to the parties’ claims not 
only appropriate but also constitutional. This choice is neither 
arbitrary nor unfair; neither party would have been justified in 
expecting Missouri to have a controlling interest as to any dispute 
between them.206  
In the 1990 Adams case, the Illinois Supreme Court applied Florida law, 
as the insemination was performed in Florida and this application would 
“fulfill the participants’ expectations and . . . help ensure predictability and 
uniformity of result.”207 In Adams, the husband and wife had been Florida 
residents, their consultations concerning fertility options occurred in 
Florida, the artificial insemination from an anonymous donor was 
performed by a Florida doctor in his Florida clinic, and the baby was born 
to the wife in Florida and was a Florida resident until the wife moved herself 
and the child to her parents’ home in Illinois where she then filed for 
divorce.208 The husband sought a determination of nonpaternity in Illinois, 
where the court determined that Florida law should govern because Florida 
had a more significant relationship than Illinois to the parentage dispute.209  
In K.M.H., the court used an interest analysis to determine whether 
Missouri or Kansas law applied.210 The children subject to the childcare 
dispute were clearly Kansas residents, had never been Missouri residents, 
and thus had Kansas as their “home state.”211 In Adams, the child had been 
living in Illinois for about five and a half months when a petition for 
divorce was filed in Illinois.212 The child was born when the parents were 
married and living in Florida.213 Clearly, Illinois was not the “home state” 
of the child under the UIFSA,214 and the court employed Florida parentage 
law.  
In initial childcare disputes before courts where there were no earlier 
determinations of legal parentage and where much of the earlier childcare 
                                                                                                             
 206. Id. 
 207. In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Ill. 1990). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. In re K.M.H., 169 P. 3d at 1031–33. 
 211. Id. at 1029 (birth mother pursued court action “seeking a determination 
that the sperm donor would have no parental rights”).  
 212. Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E. 2d at 636. 
 213. Id. at 636 (noting that the child was born August 4, 1985 and moved to 
Illinois on October 1, 1985 as well as that the divorce petition was filed on March 
13, 1986).  
 214. The child had not lived in Illinois for six months. Id.  
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occurred outside the forum, courts only sometimes employ foreign laws 
on parentage. Some courts fail to utilize a state interest analysis used in 
other choice-of-law settings. 
D. Choice of Law in Marital Parentage Presumption Cases 
Some initial parentage cases involving divorce are guided by marital 
parentage presumptions that deem, for example, that children born to 
female spouses are the presumed children of their spouses, be they male 
or female.215 Marital parentage presumptions vary significantly among 
states. For example, where presumed paternity for married men is based 
on the prospect of biological ties, state laws differ on whether such 
presumptions are rebuttable by evidence of no biological ties.216 Where a 
marriage, birth of a child, and then divorce occur in more than one state, 
the court must choose which rebuttal norms for marital parentage 
presumptions apply.  
In one New York case, the court foresaw and foreclosed the choice of law 
difficulties that could arise if dissolution proceedings that involved marital 
parentage presumptions were brought later.217 In that case, the court granted 
the petition for adoption brought by an ova donor and her spouse for the 
adoption of a child born to the spouse.218 In doing so, the court recognized that 
“other potential legal avenues” to parenthood for the nonbirth mother, like de 
facto parenthood, were less certain as only an adoption, accompanied by a 
“judicial order of filiation, ” was “presumptively subject to full faith and 
credit.”219  
In Hermanson v. Hermanson, the Nevada Supreme Court had to 
choose between California and Nevada rebuttal standards.220 Cindy was 
married to David when she delivered James in California in 1982.221 The 
couple lived in California until 1985.222 In October 1985, Cindy relocated 
                                                                                                             
 215. See, e.g., Gartner v. Iowa Dept. of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 348 
(Iowa 2013) (holding that marital parentage presumption applies to a married 
lesbian couple).  
 216. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West 2013) (rebuttal possible if 
founded on “evidence based on blood tests”), with OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
109.070(1)(b), (2) (West Supp. 2013) (providing that only a husband or wife can 
challenge the husband’s presumed paternity as long as the husband and wife are 
married and cohabitating, unless the husband and wife consent).  
 217. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009). 
 218. Id. at 693.  
 219. Id. at 687 (other, less secure, avenues to parenthood include a listing on a 
birth certificate and an execution of “a statutorily prescribed acknowledgment of 
paternity (filiation)”).  
 220. 887 P.2d 1241 (Nev. 1994).  
 221. Id. at 1242. 
 222. Id. at 1242−43.  
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with James to Iowa.223 In October 1990, Cindy “returned” to Las Vegas, 
Nevada in an attempt to reconcile with David, but this attempt lasted only 
a month.224 
In December 1990, Cindy sued David for divorce in Nevada, asserting 
that “there were no issue of the marriage.”225 David responded by requesting 
James be named his “de facto child” even though James was not his 
biological son.226 In August 1993, a Nevada trial court declared that “David 
is the father of James.”227  
Both California and Nevada have statutes declaring a husband is the 
presumed father of a child born to his wife.228 The California law, until 
January 1, 1994, however, made the presumption conclusive.229 The 
California law since then, as well as the Nevada law at all relevant times, 
made the presumption rebuttable.230 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court, holding that its application of the then-repealed California 
conclusive presumption was in error.231 The court refused to apply 
California law even though the presumption clearly arose in California 
because the child was born in and remained in California for about three 
years.232 Instead, the Nevada court utilized “the substantial relationship 
test” to resolve the conflict233 and deemed the Nevada rebuttal norms 
applicable as “[t]he parties have not resided in California for almost ten 
years[,]” James was a Nevada resident, and employment of the repealed 
California conclusive presumption law would violate “a public policy of 
Nevada.”234 
In Smith v. Smith, a Minnesota appeals court had to choose between 
its own laws and Oregon’s laws on the establishment, and then rebuttal, of 
any marital parentage presumption.235 Kim and Roger were the unwed 
biological parents of T.L.S., who was born in Oregon.236 The parents married 
in Oregon and had Roger’s name placed on the birth certificate of T.L.S. in 
Oregon.237 After the parties moved to Minnesota, they disputed physical 
custody of T.L.S. in a Minnesota court during a marriage dissolution 
                                                                                                             
 223. Id. at 1243.  
 224. Id.  
 225. Id.  
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. at 1244, 1245−46. 
 229. Id. at 1244 n.3.  
 230. Id. at 1244, 1245−46.  
 231. Id. at 1246.  
 232. Id. at 1245.  
 233. Id. at 1244. 
 234. Id. 
 235. No. C7-93-1825, 1994 WL 149445, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1994).  
 236. Id. at *1.  
 237. Id.  
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proceeding.238 Minnesota law, but not Oregon law, provided a marital 
parentage presumption for Roger.239 The Minnesota court applied the 
Minnesota presumption and its three-year time period for a mother’s request 
for a rebuttal.240 The Minnesota appellate court found its own law to be 
applicable under the Restatement of Conflict of Laws provision, which stated 
that any choice should be guided by using “the local law of the state which . . . 
has the most significant relationship to the child and the parent.”241 
In childcare disputes between spouses or one-time spouses, marital 
presumptions typically guide the parentage of those who are not birth mothers. 
These presumptions vary interstate, as do the presumption rebuttal norms. 
These variations prompt choice-of-law issues when two or more states have 
ties to the birth mothers and their spouses; these issues should prompt careful 
choice-of-law analyses rather than hurried choices of forum laws.  
E. Choice of Law in Voluntary Paternity Acknowledgment Cases 
Some initial parentage cases in one state can involve an earlier birth 
certificate voluntary paternity acknowledgment executed in another state, like 
LP v. LF, which the Wyoming Supreme Court decided in 2014.242 In 2011, 
the mother sought to disestablish her former boyfriend as her child’s father 
because the man had no biological ties to the child.243 The child was born in 
Colorado at the end of 2003, and the former boyfriend was “listed as the father 
on the child’s birth certificate.”244 The mother and the former boyfriend lived 
together in Colorado for at least a year and a half and then in Washington State 
for one or two months.245 Then, they lived separately in Wyoming for about 
five years.246 The former boyfriend “helped some, but not a lot” with the 
child’s expenses.247  
                                                                                                             
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at *2.  
 240. Id. at *3. 
 241. Id. at *2−3 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
287(1) (1969) and referencing MINN. STAT. § 257.57(1)(b) (1992)); see also 
Taylor v. Taylor, No. CA 10-1503, 2011 WL 1734077, at *2 (La. Ct. App. May 
4, 2011) (Louisiana marital parentage presumption rebuttal law limiting time for 
challenge applied to presumption that arose in Texas where the now-divorced 
couple had never lived in Louisiana as a married couple; court noted “a strong 
policy of favoring the legitimacy of children”).  
 242. 338 P.3d 908 (Wyo. 2014). 
 243. Id. at 910−11. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 910. 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id.  
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The Wyoming high court granted the mother’s petition to “disprove 
paternity,”248 finding that the man was not a “presumptive parent” under 
Wyoming law and, even if so, was not a parent as “the presumption was 
conclusively rebutted” by a stipulated paternity test finding no biological 
ties.249 Further, the court declined “to adopt de facto parentage or parentage 
by estoppel, . . . leaving that important policy decision to the Wyoming 
Legislature.”250 
The Wyoming Supreme Court failed to explain, however, why it gave no 
respect to the Colorado birth certificate and the likely voluntary paternity 
acknowledgment on which the birth certificate was founded.251 Recall, by 
contrast, the Illinois and Ohio statutes requiring that their state courts give full 
faith and credit to voluntary parentage acknowledgments executed 
elsewhere.252 Had the Wyoming Supreme Court granted respect, the choice 
of law question for the Wyoming court would have been whether the 
Colorado or Wyoming standards for rescinding parentage acknowledgments 
should be employed.253  
F. Choice of Law in Other Initial Child Support Cases 
Initial requests for court-ordered child support can, of course, occur in 
courts that are neither home nor responding state tribunals. They can occur 
in either marriage dissolution or paternity actions. In each setting, child 
support for a child may be first sought in one state where the facts prompting 
the alleged parentage of the child support respondent occurred in a second 
state.  
                                                                                                             
 248. Id. at 910, 913.  
 249. Id. at 921. 
 250. Id.  
 251. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(1)(c)(II) (West Supp. 2008) (man is 
presumed a child’s father if named with his consent on child’s birth certificate).  
 252. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02(B) (West 2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 45/27 (2009). 
 253. These standards do vary interstate. In Wyoming, the standard for 
rescission is that a signatory may only rescind within 60 days or before the date 
of the first hearing of a case involving the signatory’s parentage, but no more than 
two years later. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-607(a), 14-2-608(a)(ii) (West Supp. 
2008). In Colorado, the standard for rescission is within 60 days or by the date of 
any administrative or judicial proceeding to which the signatory is a party. COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(2)(b) (West Supp. 2008). Had the mother sought 
rescission in Washington while she and the man lived there, the forum state 
standard may have been used, which would have been within 60 days or before 
the date of the first hearing, but no more than four years later. WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 26.26.330(1), 26.26.335(1)(b) (West 2005).  
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In a North Dakota proceeding, Antonyio Johnson sought a divorce from 
Madonna Johnson in July 1998.254 Madonna claimed that the court should 
order Antonyio to pay child support for Jessica, who Madonna urged had 
been equitably adopted by Antonyio under North Dakota law.255 The 
Johnson marriage occurred in September 1986, with no child ever born to 
Madonna during the marriage.256 But in August 1988, the Johnsons took 
custody of Jessica while living in New Jersey.257 Jessica was three months 
old and the natural granddaughter of Madonna.258 Although Jessica was 
scheduled to remain with the Johnsons for only a month, she remained with 
the Johnsons for ten years until the time of the divorce proceeding.259 During 
this decade, the Johnsons raised Jessica as their child, and the Johnsons 
initiated formal adoption proceedings in New Jersey and in Kentucky, 
where Jessica’s natural parents lived in 1990;260 however, neither of those 
proceedings were completed due to military work transfers.261 From 
November 1987 through November 1991, the Johnsons resided in New 
Jersey, although Antonyio served in the Desert Storm campaign from 
August 1990 to May 1991.262 Antonyio was then stationed in the Azores 
from November 1991 to February 1993, was stationed in Florida from 
February 1993 to May 1997, was on assignment in Korea as of May 1997 
and on assignment in Grand Forks, North Dakota since May 1998.263 
Antonyio and Madonna had not resided together since the Korea 
assignment.264 When Antonyio was in the Azores, “Madonna and Jessica 
stayed in Kentucky because they could not accompany him.”265 The North 
Dakota trial court denied Madonna’s child support request.266  
The North Dakota Supreme Court employed the North Dakota 
doctrine of equitable adoption, looking to earlier cases on “contracts to 
adopt only in the context of inheritance law.”267 The court determined that 
the public policy of the state supports application of the doctrine to impose 
a child support obligation under certain circumstances, and nothing in North 
                                                                                                             
 254. Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 100 (N.D. 2000). 
 255. Id. at 101.  
 256. Id. at 100.  
 257. Id. 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. 
 261. Id.  
 262. Id. at 124. 
 263. Id.  
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 100.  
 266. Id. at 101.  
 267. Id. at 103. 
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Dakota law forbids that application.268 Thus, the high court remanded the 
case for resolution of the factual question involving the “application of the 
doctrine to impose a child support obligation upon Antonyio.”269  
A dissenting justice began: “This is a case of a grandmother and her 
grandchild who have never lived in North Dakota.”270 He went on: “it is 
clear that if an ‘equitable adoption’ took place, it took place in New Jersey 
or Kentucky and would therefore be governed by the law of one of those 
states.”271 In both New Jersey and Kentucky, there was no doctrine of 
equitable adoption.272 The dissent deemed New Jersey or Kentucky law 
appropriate under North Dakota choice-of-law rules for contract cases.273 
The dissent also observed that the “majority ignores jurisdictional 
implications and comity.”274 In particular, “no attempt” to notify the 
biological parents275 presumably still in Kentucky had occurred. 
The North Dakota high court majority did not respond to the observations 
in the dissent on choice of law in contract cases, perhaps because the majority 
deemed that an equitable adoption did not involve a contract. The dissent 
seemingly assumed Antonyio contracted with his wife to adopt Jessica, thus 
                                                                                                             
 268. Id. at 109. Such an application of the equitable adoption doctrine was 
“limited,” however, as the court expressed “preference for adherence to statutory 
procedures” on formal adoptions. Id. at 105−06 n.3. 
 269. Id. at 109−10.  
 270. Id. at 112 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 123 (“[I]t objectively appears that our precedent would mandate the 
application of another forum’s law because the alleged contract arose in either 
Kentucky or New Jersey and was performed in either of those states, the subject 
matter was in either of those states, and the domicile of all parties was in either of 
those states at the time the alleged contract was made.”). Justice Sandstrom also 
referenced Pearson v. Pearson, 606 N.W.2d 128, 131 (N.D. 2000), explaining 
that “a common law marriage validly entered in another jurisdiction would be 
recognized in North Dakota” even though North Dakota law “[does] not allow 
common law marriage.” Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 123. The existence of a common 
law marriage—as with the existence of Jessica’s equitable adoption by 
Antonyio—normally would not actually be recognized by a foreign court. Yet in 
Pearson, there was a North Dakota statute obliging state courts to render “valid” 
marriages “contracted” outside of the state which would be deemed valid “where 
contracted.” Pearson, 606 N.W.2d at 131 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08 
(West 2008)). And in Pearson, the validity of the alleged foreign country common 
law marriage was never fully resolved by the North Dakota court as this issue was 
unnecessary to the final decision. Id. By contrast, in Johnson, there was no statute 
obliging North Dakota courts to render valid any parentage “contracted” 
elsewhere, to the extent contracts were relevant in parentage matters. 
 274. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 112. 
 275. Id. at 118. Perhaps the dissent would have been less concerned with the 
absence of notice to the biological parents had the initial issue in North Dakota 
been guardianship of Jessica by Antonyio and Madonna. See, e.g., Wilson v. 
Wilson, 431 S.W.3d 369 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013).  
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considering the contract laws of New Jersey and Kentucky to be potentially 
applicable. Yet, could not the contract be seen as one between Antonyio and 
Jessica’s biological parents? If so, would not Pennsylvania law, where 
Antonyio and Madonna first took Jessica, be potentially applicable? 
Unfortunately, no opinion in Johnson considered utilizing an interest 
analysis to determine which state’s imprecise parentage law on equitable 
adoption or its equivalent should operate. And no opinion in Johnson 
considered whether to decline jurisdiction altogether or at least over the 
parentage, if not the child support, issue as to Antonyio.276 As to the issue 
of Antonyio’s parentage, a prerequisite to any judicial inquiry into either 
support or custody, one may reasonably question whether North Dakota 
even had federal constitutional authority to choose to apply its own law.277 
G. Choice of Law in Adoption Cases  
In some adoption cases, state courts must choose between competing 
state parentage laws. For instance, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., a 
Kansas appellate court considered the adoption of a child born in Kansas 
to a Kansas resident in 1996.278 The child was conceived in Ohio, and the 
unwed biological father resided in Ohio.279 The mother and her new 
boyfriend had moved to Kansas from Ohio in February of 1994 with the 
child and relinquished the child for adoption there in late April 1994.280 
The court addressed whether Kansas or Ohio laws on termination of 
parental rights would be used to assess the unwed biological father’s rights 
in the adoption proceeding.281 Though the father had never lived in Kansas, 
the court employed Kansas law.282 The court found it reasonable “for 
parties to expect that the standards for parental obligations would be 
determined by the laws of the state where the child resides.”283 Under 
Kansas law, termination was appropriate because the biological father 
“failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during 
                                                                                                             
 276. The factors utilized in such considerations include: “length of time child 
has resided outside [the] state,” the location of the evidence, and the familiarity 
with the relevant facts and issues. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14.1-18. 
 277. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (lack of 
majority opinion prompts uncertainties regarding minimum state interests needed 
to avoid federal constitutional Full Fail and Credit Clause concerns).  
 278. 912 P.2d 761, 764 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). 
 279. Id.  
 280. Id. at 764–65.  
 281. Id. at 766 (employing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(4), (5) (West Supp. 
2012)).  
 282. Id. at 768. 
 283. Id. at 767.  
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the six months prior to the child’s birth.”284 Choosing Kansas law was 
“neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”285 The father relinquished or 
otherwise ignored his parental obligations to a child living in Kansas.286 
Further, the father failed “to make substantial efforts to remain in contact 
with an unwed mother and participate in the pregnancy and birth of the 
child,”287 including failing to make “serious efforts to locate [the] 
whereabouts” of his pregnant former girlfriend288 who “did not move to 
conceal herself” and who had “obtained a listed phone number under her 
name.”289 
In Stubbs v. Weathersby, the Oregon Supreme Court considered the acts 
of a birth mother whose child an Oregon couple sought to adopt.290 The 
couple urged that the mother’s consent was unnecessary because the mother 
had consented to the adoption and she had willfully neglected her child 
without just cause for a year.291 The child was conceived in Texas, but born 
and raised by the mother for one month in Washington.292 After this month, 
the child was in foster care in Washington for about six months.293 The 
prospective adopters then brought the child to Oregon, prompting an end to 
a Washington juvenile court dependency proceeding.294 An Oregon 
adoption proceeding was begun, and the court entertained it as the child had 
been living in Oregon for six consecutive months with the prospective 
adopters who were deemed “persons acting as parents.”295 
On the issues regarding maternal consent, the Oregon court applied 
Oregon laws,296 although the mother prepared and signed the alleged 
consent in Washington, and any neglectful maternal acts prompting the lack 
of a requirement of maternal consent occurred in Washington.297 In applying 
Oregon law, the court recognized the interest of Washington as “the state in 
which the consent is signed” and “where the parent-child relationship 
exists,” as well as the “dangers of forum shopping in adoption cases” when 
forum law is applied.298 Yet the court found the UCCJA “mitigates” the 
dangers because that law “guarantees that the forum state has an interest 
                                                                                                             
 284. Id. at 769 (employing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(4)).  
 285. Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981)). 
 286. Id. at 766–67.  
 287. Id. at 767.  
 288. Id.  
 289. Id. at 767, 765. 
 290. 892 P.2d 991, 994 (Or. 1995) (en banc). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 993. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 993–94. 
 295. Id. at 996–97.  
 296. Id. at 998.  
 297. Id. at 997, 993–94.  
 298. Id. at 997.  
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in applying its own law” and that “unusual circumstances” could prompt, 
in other cases, the application of foreign state law.299 
Comparable to Stubbs on the issue of which law applied to the 
withdrawal of a maternal consent to a proposed adoption is the 1978 
Arizona Supreme Court decision in In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile 
Action No. B-7087.300 In that case, the mother sought to revoke an initial 
consent made in Arkansas after she moved to Arizona.301 The Arizona high 
court applied Arkansas, not the more stringent Arizona, revocation law in 
allowing maternal revocation because an Arkansas adoption was always 
expected—the consent form was “drawn for filing in an Arkansas court”—
and before her alleged consent, the mother was advised of law.302 The 
court made no mention of the need for, or any finding of, exceptional 
circumstances.  
In Arizona, a foreign parentage law applied even though the alleged 
parent lived in Arizona, but in Oregon, a local parentage law was applied 
even though the alleged parent lived outside of Oregon. The two cases 
clearly exemplify the interstate disagreements on the initial application of 
parentage laws to alleged out-of-state parents in adoption cases.  
In adoption cases, parental rights termination proceedings are usually 
unnecessary for biological fathers who have failed to step up to parenthood 
and thus have failed to achieve parental status.303 In Utah, a choice-of-law 
statute recognizes that in a Utah adoption proceeding, such an out-of-state 
father may only need to comply with the step up requirements of his own 
state’s laws.304 
Typically in adoption cases, veto powers are held by the legal parents 
who did not initiate the adoption proceedings. Yet to be such a legal parent, 
one must comply with imprecise parentage laws on seizing parental 
                                                                                                             
 299. Id. at 997, 998 n.6 (suggesting that exceptional circumstances include 
settings where the parties in an Oregon adoption case “intended” for some foreign 
state law to apply); see also State ex rel. S.O., 122 P.3d 686,689 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005) (using “most significant relationship” test); Hanlon v. Mooney, 407 So. 2d 
554, 557–58 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (using Alabama law to assess consent to 
adoption executed in Indiana).  
 300. 577 P.2d 714 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc).  
 301. Id. at 714. 
 302. Id. at 715–16.  
 303. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the court found such state 
statutory barriers to participation rights for unwed biological fathers in adoption 
proceedings were constitutionally permissible as male biological ties alone did 
not prompt federal constitutional childcare interests. Id. at 267–68. 
 304. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B) (2013) (compliance with 
parental rights requirements of “the last state” where the unmarried biological 
father knew the mother resided); see also Nevares v. M.L.S., 345 P.3d 719 (Utah 
2015). 
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opportunities, assuming no applicable precise parentage laws—as with a 
voluntary acknowledgment or paternity court judgment. Here, veto 
authority should not always be guided by the forum state law on whether 
there has been compliance, as where the purported parent has not had 
direct contacts with the forum. 
V. CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPRECISE AMERICAN STATE LAWS WHEN 
FIRST DETERMINING PARENTAGE 
In varying case settings, like child support, childcare, and adoption, a 
court often must determine parentage for the first time. These 
determinations are especially difficult when imprecise parentage laws, 
such as presumed or de facto parenthood, operate where the relevant 
conduct exclusively or chiefly occurred outside the forum. When two 
American state laws on imprecise parentage differ, the court should not 
always apply its own parentage laws but should apply its own choice-of-
law standards. Statutory and uniform law provisions dictating the use of 
forum parentage law without any choice-of-law analysis spur uncertainties 
and unfortunate forum shopping. Courts must develop new choice-of-law 
precedents requiring occasional employment of foreign state laws on 
imprecise parentage. These precedents are needed in a variety of cases, 
including marriage dissolution, adoption, and child support. 
In choosing between imprecise parentage laws in varying legal 
settings with similar factual circumstances, a court should not always 
choose the same state law. Thus, forum law may be properly chosen in one 
setting, as with child support, but not in another setting, as with childcare. 
This is not problematic, as even within a single state, parentage laws often 
differ depending upon setting. Thus, an unwed biological father can be a 
legal parent for child support purposes, but not a legal parent with 
childcare rights or adoption veto powers. In an imprecise parentage law 
setting, courts may need to assess competing state interests differently if 
monetary support is sought from a forum resident whose child is outside 
the forum, if childcare opportunities are sought by a forum resident whose 
child is outside the forum, and if an adoption is considered for a child 
outside the forum but where the child’s parent resides in the forum asked 
to consider the termination of parental rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Not too long ago, American state laws chiefly designated parentage at 
precise moments in time. One became a parent upon giving birth, upon 
having one’s spouse give birth, upon formal adoption, upon completion of 
a birth certificate or a voluntary paternity acknowledgment, or upon a 
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paternity case judgment. A state would usually respect these parentage 
designations from another state, even though certain parentage 
designations—as with a marital paternity presumption or a voluntary 
parentage acknowledgment—could later be voided through a rebuttal or 
rescission occurring without a parental rights termination proceeding.305  
Today, American state laws also increasingly allow for parentage 
establishments to be based on conduct occurring at no precise moment in 
time, as with residing with and supporting a child, typically called de facto 
or presumed parenthood.306 Certain parentage disestablishments also often 
depend upon earlier conduct occurring at no precise moment in time.307 
 When conduct relevant to legal parentage occurs in one state and legal 
parentage is later to be initially established in another state, the second 
state’s court frequently fails to respect the imprecise parentage laws of the 
state where the conduct occurred.308 Comparably, the second state’s court 
often fails to respect the first state’s norms on disestablishing legal 
parentage even though the relevant conduct occurred there.309 Although 
respect is not always due, applications by the second state’s court of its 
own parentage laws should not be automatic. Yet proposed uniform 
statutes, as well as federal and state statutes, are read to suggest this 
mandate. These readings are wrong because they fail to account for the 
possibility that the second state’s court should defer to the first state’s 
parentage norms because, possibly, governmental interest analysis favors 
the first state. 
This Article urges that the second state’s court should explore in 
parentage cases whether there are conflicting, imprecise parentage laws 
and, if so, whether it should utilize its own choice of law rules to resolve 
any conflict. This may mean, as with choice of law rules compelling an 
interest analysis in other settings, that the resolution of which state’s 
imprecise parentage law controls may vary depending upon context. For 
example, parentage law choices may differ in multistate child support and 
childcare cases where an alleged parent lives in the forum while the child 
and custodial parent live outside the forum. Here, the forum has a 
significant interest in what its resident should pay for child support—albeit 
for a child residing elsewhere—especially if the resident has never left the 
forum. Yet the child’s and custodial parent’s state of residency has a 
significant interest in the day-to-day childcare provided to the child, even 
                                                                                                             
 305. See Parness, Handling Imprecise Parentage, supra note 14, at 409–10. 
 306. Id. at 404–05.  
 307. Thus, voluntary paternity acknowledgments can be rescinded more than 
60 days later if there is shown fraud, duress or mistake, though the state law 
rescission procedures vary widely. Parness & Townsend, supra note 11, at 82–87. 
 308. See supra Part IV.  
 309. See supra Part IV.D.  
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if the noncustodial parent has never lived there. As well, parentage law 
choices may differ in voluntary parentage acknowledgment establishment 
and disestablishment cases where the signing occurred in one state and 
where the fraud leading to the signing occurred in a different state. Here, 
the norms on how to sign may best come from where signing occurred 
while the norms on fraud may best come from where the fraud occurred. 
New judicial precedents are needed when initial parentage 
establishment and parentage disestablishment disputes involve significant 
conduct outside the forum. Sometimes courts should choose not to employ 
the imprecise parentage laws of the forum. 
  

